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Abstract—This paper presents a novel distributed control
strategy for large-scale deployment of flexible demand in power
systems. A game theoretical setting is adopted, modelling the
loads as rational players that aim to complete an assigned task
at minimum cost and compete for power consumption at the
cheapest hours of the day. The main novelty is the analysis
of power systems with congestion: the proposed modelling
framework envisages heterogeneous groups of loads that operate
at different buses, connected by transmission lines of limited
capacity. The locational marginal prices of electricity, different
in general for each bus, are calculated through an optimal power
flow problem, accounting for the impact of the flexible devices on
power demand and generation. A new iterative scheme for flexible
demand coordination is analytically characterized as a multi-
valued mapping. Its convergence to a stable market configuration
(i.e. variational Wardrop equilibrium) and global optimality are
analytically demonstrated, for any penetration level of flexible
demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations of
the proposed control strategy are discussed, evaluating their
performance with simulations on the IEEE 24-bus system.
Index Terms—Flexible demand, distributed control, transmis-
sion network, locational marginal prices, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The penetration of flexible loads, such as smart appliances
and electric vehicles, is expected to increase significantly in the
future, with significant potential benefits. The electrification
of transportation can mitigate the shortage of fossil fuels and
improve energy efficiency [1], while the increasing flexibility
of demand can be exploited to provide ancillary services [2].
On the other hand, the growing penetration of flexible loads
has certain potential drawbacks [3], [4]. For instance, the
diffusion of flexible loads will change consumption patterns,
potentially causing new demand peaks and significant voltage
deviations in the power grid. Proper coordination of flexible
appliances can avoid such undesirable effects and, at the same
time, facilitate the integration of renewables, reduce operating
cost and improve stability and reliability of the grid [5], [6].
B. Relevant work
A consistent amount of research has been carried out to
achieve flexible demand coordination, evaluating centralized
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and decentralized approaches. Centralized control strategies
such as [7], [8] envision a central entity that collects infor-
mation from all flexible appliances and centrally determines
their power consumption in order to optimize some global
objectives. However, these schemes become complicated to
implement and computationally expensive for large numbers
of flexible appliances, making them unsuitable for big and
complex systems. Better scalability is obtained with distributed
schemes that also preserve the privacy of the appliances. Mul-
tiple decentralized approaches have been considered, including
Lagrange relaxation methods [9], congestion pricing [10] and
stochastic pricing [11]. Game theory has also been extensively
applied to devise distributed control strategies for coordination
of flexible loads [12]–[18]. The general approach adopted in
these papers is to model the flexible loads as self-interested
players that compete for energy consumption at the cheapest
prices. On this basis, distributed control actions are designed in
order to converge to a stable market outcome (characterized as
a Nash equilibrium) and to possibly maximize social welfare.
It is worth noting that all these works consider a unique
price function throughout the grid, repartitioning total costs
among the users proportionally to their fraction of total power
consumption [12] or assuming that the electricity price is some
monotone increasing function of total power demand [13]–
[18]. This choice captures a fundamental property of electricity
markets, where the marginal cost of generation is increasing
and higher supply corresponds to higher prices. However,
the proposed modelling frameworks only consider distribution
networks [13], [17], [18] or conduct a whole-system analysis
[14]–[16] that does not account for any underlying network
topology. Moreover, the pricing schemes in [12]–[18] neglect
two fundamental characteristics of realistic power grids: the
presence of multiple buses (connected by transmission lines
of limited capacity) and, as a result, the arising of different
locational marginal prices (LMPs) throughout the system.
Recent work has proposed novel modelling approaches that
incorporate the transmission network, investigating the impact
of EVs [19], [20], and more generally demand response [21],
[22] on LMPs. The interactions between distribution and
transmission and the impact of uncertainties have also been
assessed in [23] and [24], respectively. However, differently
from [12]–[18], all the cited papers [19]–[24] do not provide
any theoretical guarantee on the convergence to equilibrium
and social optimality of their coordination scheme.
C. Contributions
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the
research approaches presented in [12]–[18] and in [19]–[24].
2In particular, the framework presented in this work combines
a rigorous theoretical analysis (guaranteeing convergence and
optimality of the proposed coordination scheme) with an ex-
plicit modelling of the transmission infrastructure (accounting
for the underlying network topology and assessing the impact
of demand response on LMPs and generation costs).
These results are obtained considering heterogeneous price-
responsive loads operating at distinct buses of the power
system. The congestion of transmission lines is taken into
account and the LMPs at each bus are characterized as the
Lagrange multipliers associated to a linearized AC optimal
power flow (ACOPF) problem, whose solution depends on the
operation strategy of the flexible loads. The proposed coordi-
nation scheme for flexible demand relies on the preliminary
findings of [25] and envisions iterative better-response updates
by the price-responsive appliances, which are characterized as
the evolution of a multi-valued mapping. The formulation and
the results of [25] have been expanded to explicitly consider a
more complex pricing structure with LMPs. In order to account
for the congestion of the transmission lines and the potential
price jumps that this might cause, a more general class of
aggregative games has been considered and a novel notion of
variational Wardrop equilibrium is introduced. Through the
application of Lyapunov tools, it is demonstrated that the
proposed coordination scheme converges to an equilibrium and
achieves global optimality for any penetration level of flexible
demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations
of the proposed scheme and simulative results on the IEEE
24-bus system are also provided.
D. Paper structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
describes the chosen power system model and the properties
of the linearized ACOPF solution. Section III presents the
modeling of the flexible appliances and the considered game-
theoretical setup. Section IV proposes a distributed scheme
for flexible demand coordination and demonstrates its con-
vergence and optimality properties. The performance of the
proposed control strategy, including its robustness with respect
to uncertainties, is evaluated in simulation in Section V, while
Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
II. MODELLING OF OPTIMAL POWER FLOW AND
ELECTRICITY PRICES
The considered power system is composed by a finite set
M = {1, . . . ,M} of distinct buses. The set of transmission
lines (of limited capacity) linking two buses is denoted as
L = {1, . . . ,L}, with s(l), r(l) ∈ M indicating the refe-
rence sending and receiving nodes of line l, respectively.
A linearized ACOPF problem is solved over the discrete
time interval T = {1, . . . ,T}. We denote by D ∈ RMT and
DQ ∈ RMT the vectors of active and reactive power demand.
The single components Dm,t and DQm,t correspond to the
total active and reactive power demand at bus m at time t.
A similar vector notation is adopted for active and reactive
generation (G and GQ, respectively), voltage angles θ and
voltage magnitudes v, denoting by Gm,t , GQm,t , θm,t and vm,t
their scalar values for bus m and time t. The formulation in
[26] is adopted for the linearized ACOPF:
ϕ(D) = min
G,GQ,θ ,v2
M
∑
m=1
T
∑
t=1
fm(Gm,t) (1)
subject to (∀l ∈L ,m ∈M , t ∈T ):
Pl,t = gl
v2s(l),t − v2r(l),t
2
−bl
[
θs(l),t −θr(l),t
]
+PLl,t (2a)
Ql,t =−bl
v2s(l),t − v2r(l),t
2
−gl
[
θs(l),t −θr(l),t
]
+QLl,t (2b)
Gm,t −Dm,t = ∑
{l:s(l)=m}
Pl,t − ∑
{l:r(l)=m}
Pl,t +
M
∑
n=1
Gmnv2m (2c)
GQm,t −DQm,t = ∑
{l:s(l)=m}
Ql,t − ∑
{l:r(l)=m}
Ql,t −
M
∑
n=1
Bmnv2m (2d)
¯
Gm ≤ Gm,t ≤ G¯m (2e)
¯
GQm ≤ GQm,t ≤ ¯GQm (2f)
¯
v2m ≤ v2m,t ≤ v¯2m (2g)
¯
θm ≤ θm,t ≤ θ¯m (2h)(
sin(2pic/a)− sin(2pi(c−1)/a)
)
·Pl,t − sin(2pi/a) · S¯l
−
(
cos(2pic/a)− cos(2pi(c−1)/a)
)
·Ql,t ≤ 0 c = 1, . . . ,a (2i)
The linearized ACOPF in (1)-(2) determines active (and
reactive) power generation G (and GQ), voltage angles θ
and squared voltage magnitude v2 that minimize generation
costs. The function fm(g) in (1) is the cost of generating g
units of power at bus m and is assumed to be strictly convex.
Constraints (2a)-(2b) are the linearized expressions of active
(and reactive) power flow Pl,t (and Ql,t ) on line l, where gl
and bl are conductance and susceptance of the line. Details
on the expressions and linearization of the power losses terms
PLl,t and Q
L
l,t are in [26]. Constraints (2c)-(2d) are the nodal
balance expressions for active and reactive power. The last
sums in their right-hand side represent the power flows on the
shunt elements, where G and B are the real and imaginary
part of the admittance matrix. Bounds on G, GQ, v2 and θ are
imposed in (2e)-(2h). The capacity constraint P2l,t +Q
2
l,t ≤ S¯2l
of line l at time t is represented in (2i) by a piecewise
linearization [27] which approximates the circle P2l,t +Q
2
l,t = S¯
2
l
in the P-Q plane as a convex regular polygon of a sides.
A. Electricity prices
In order to characterize the locational marginal prices asso-
ciated to a certain vector of demand values D, some properties
of ϕ(D) are preliminarily discussed.
Proposition 1: The minimized generation cost ϕ(D) is a
strictly convex function on any set [Dmin,Dmax]MT ⊂ RMT+ .
Proof: See Appendix A.
From the convexity result of Proposition 1, ϕ(D) is Lip-
schitz continuous on some open interval (Dmin,Dmax)
MT in-
cluding all feasible values of demand. It straightly follows
3that ϕ(D) is differentiable almost everywhere [28], with the
exception of some zero-measure set D ⊂ (Dmin,Dmax)MT .
Introducing the notion of sub-differential, we can write:
∂ϕ(D)
∂Dm,t
=
{
ϕ ′m,t(D) if D 6∈D[
¯
ϕ ′m,t(D), ϕ¯ ′m,t(D)
]
if D ∈D (3)
where
¯
ϕ ′m,t(D) and ϕ¯ ′m,t(D) are the left and right partial
derivatives of ϕ(D) with respect to Dm,t .
The electricity price pm,t is chosen as the Lagrange multi-
plier associated to the power balance constraint (2c), i.e. the
marginal cost of providing an additional unit of power at bus
m at time t. Within the considered theoretical framework, this
price corresponds to the partial derivative presented in (3). To
account for the points of non-differentiability of the optimized
cost ϕ(D), two distinct price signals are considered:
¯
pm,t(D) =
{
ϕ ′m,t(D) if D 6∈D
¯
ϕ ′m,t(D) if D ∈D . (4a)
p¯m,t(D) =
{
ϕ ′m,t(D) if D 6∈D
ϕ¯ ′m,t(D) if D ∈D . (4b)
Under the current formulation, p¯m,t is the marginal cost of
providing an additional unit of power at bus m. Conversely,
¯
pm,t represents the marginal saving of reducing by one unit
the power supplied to bus m.
We wish to emphasize that the double price formulation
in (4) is not only a mathematical technical detail but it also
represents a crucial element in correctly characterizing price
variations and the cost minimization of the loads. In particular,
the proposed formulation allows to formally account for the
price “jumps” resulting from a marginal generator reaching
its maximum capacity or the saturation of some line. In
these cases, the electricity price will vary discontinuously.
Considering the corresponding value of the demand vector D,
the quantities
¯
pm,t(D) and p¯m,t(D) will represent the different
price values at bus m and time t before and after the jump.
It follows that D ∈D and the minimized cost function ϕ(D)
will not be differentiable in these particular cases.
The price discontinuities are particularly relevant in the cost
minimization problem of flexible demand. Each load, in order
to correctly evaluate its cost variation, will have to consider
¯
pm,t when its power consumption is reduced (thus reducing
total demand D) and p¯m,t when its power consumption is
increased (thus increasing total demand D). This is consistent
with the equilibrium formulation in Definition 2, where the
considered prices are selected accordingly to the sign of the
associated power scheduling variation.
B. Local monotonicity of prices
As a preliminary step in the definition of the proposed
control scheme and in the theoretical assessment of its con-
vergence and optimality properties, an important monotonicity
property of the prices in (4) is presented.
Proposition 2: Assume strict convexity of the generation
cost functions fm(G) in (1). For any bus m ∈M and time
t ∈T , the corresponding electricity prices p¯m,t(D) and
¯
pm,t(D)
are monotone increasing with respect to demand Dm,t at the
same bus m and time instant t.
Proof: See Appendix B.
From the above considerations, the following power quantity
can now be introduced:
Definition 1: Consider a demand vector D∈RMT , a bus m∈
M and two time instants t¯,
¯
t ∈T . The quantity ε(D,m, t¯,
¯
t) is
defined as follows:
ε(D,m, t¯,
¯
t) := argmin
x≥0
(∣∣p¯m,t¯(D+ x · (eˆm,t¯ − eˆm,
¯
t))
−
¯
pm,
¯
t(D+ x · (eˆm,t¯ − eˆm,
¯
t))
∣∣) (5)
where eˆm,t is the unit vector of the standard orthogonal basis
associated to bus m and time t.
In the above definition, ε is the positive amount of power that
can be swapped between
¯
t ant t¯ in order to minimize their price
differential. From the monotonicity of
¯
pm,t and p¯m,t , when
p¯m,t¯ ≤
¯
pm,
¯
t the quantity ε corresponds to the maximum power
swap between
¯
t and t¯ that preserves their original price order.
Remark 1: The price monotonicity introduced in Proposition
2 is used to formally prove convergence to equilibrium of
the proposed control scheme. This convergence result can
still be proven in more general contexts where the considered
OPF problem is not convex and the price monotonicity is not
guaranteed. In this case, it is sufficient to verify (21a) through
a Taylor expansion of the minimized cost ϕ and replace ε in
(5) by a suitable “sufficiently small” power variation.
III. MODELLING OF FLEXIBLE DEMAND
This section presents the modelling framework of the
flexible loads. These are described as price-responsive ratio-
nal agents, characterizing their interactions through a game-
theoretical set-up and introducing the concept of variational
Wardrop equilibrium.
A. Individual devices and impact on aggregate power demand
A population N = {1, . . . ,N} of price-responsive devices
is considered, denoting by µ j ∈M the power system bus
in which the flexible load j ∈ N operates. The flexible
appliances are considered as self-interested rational agents
that operate over the discrete time interval T = {1, . . . ,T}.
In particular, each appliance j ∈ N schedules its power
consumption over time u j =
[
u j,1, . . . ,u j,T
] ∈ RT in order to
complete an assigned task at minimum energy cost. The task of
agent j can be unequivocally characterized by three quantities:
• Its rated power Pj.
• The total energy E j required to complete its task.
• The set of time instants A j ⊆ T during which it is
available to operate.
Any feasible power consumption profile u j guaranteeing task
completion for agent j belongs to the set U j, defined as:
U j :=
{
u j ∈ RT :
T
∑
t=1
u j,t ·∆t = E j ,
0≤ u j,t ≤ Pj ·1A j(t) ∀t ∈T
} (6)
where ∆t denotes the time discretization step and 1S (t) is the
indicator function:
1S (t) =
{
1 if t ∈S
0 if t 6∈S . (7)
4The equality in (6) ensures that the total energy consumed
by appliance j is equal to the energy required to complete
its task. The inequalities in (6) impose that the (positive)
power consumption of appliance j cannot exceed its rated
power Pj for t within the availability interval A j and must be
zero for t outside it. The proposed notation can be extended,
representing by u = [u1, . . . ,uN ] ∈ RNT the scheduled power
profile of the whole population and by U = U1× ·· · ×UN
the corresponding feasibility set.
Assumption 1: The power scheduling problem admits at
least one solution. In other words, the parameters (Pj,E j,A j)
of each device j are such that U 6=∅.
In order to account for the impact of the flexible appliances
on the power system quantities discussed in Section II, it
is sufficient to replace the demand vector D ∈ RMT with a
function D(u) :U →RMT of the power scheduling u. For the
individual demand component Dm,t , it holds:
Dm,t(u) = dm,t + ∑
{ j:µ j=m}
u j,t (8)
where dm,t is the known inflexible demand at bus m at time t.
Remark 2: Consistently with previous works [19]–[22], [24]
on the subject, the proposed modelling framework directly
considers the impact of flexible demand at a transmission
level and it does not specifically account for the effects on
the underlying distribution network. As discussed in Section
VI, an explicit characterization of the distribution network will
be a key direction for further research in this area.
B. Game-theoretical framework and Wardrop equilibrium
The coordination of the power scheduling by the flexible
appliances is analyzed within a game-theoretical framework.
Each device is modeled as a self-interested player that aims
to minimize its individual cost in response to broadcast price
signals. The following competitive game is considered:
• Players: The set N of flexible devices.
• Strategies: The set U j of feasible power profiles for a
single flexible device j ∈N .
• Objective function: Energy cost of task completion. For a
certain price signal p :T →R+, the following expression
can be provided for the cost C j of device j:
C j =
T
∑
t=1
pt ·u j,t∆t. (9)
Within this framework, the flexible loads are rational agents
competing for power consumption at cheap prices. In the next
section, we propose a coordination strategy of the devices that
ensures convergence to a stable market configuration. This is
expressed as a variational Wardrop equilibrium, defined next.
Definition 2: The scheduled power consumption u∗ ∈U ⊂
RNT corresponds to a variational Wardrop equilibrium if the
following holds for all u ∈U :
∆C j = ∑
t: u j,t≥u∗j,t
p¯∗µ j ,t
[
u j,t −u∗j,t
]
∆t
− ∑
t:u j,t≤u∗j,t ¯
p∗µ j ,t
[
u∗j,t −u j,t
]
∆t ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈N (10)
¯
p∗m,t =
¯
pm,t (D(u∗)) p¯∗m,t = p¯m,t (D(u
∗)) ∀m ∈M , ∀t ∈T .
(11)
This definition represents an extension of the Wardrop
equilibrium concept (or aggregative equilibrium), which has
already been applied in the context of price-responsive demand
coordination [14], [29], [30]. The general idea in these works
is to characterize the equilibrium as a fixed point: the power
scheduling of each device is optimal for a certain price signal
and, at the same time, the aggregate power consumption of all
loads induces that very same price. This concept satisfyingly
approximates a Nash equilibrium if the effect of the individual
player on the global quantities of the system is negligible. This
is true in the present case of large-scale deployment of flexible
demand, as the power consumption of a single device is orders
of magnitude smaller than total power demand.
Definition 2 proposes a generalization of the Wardrop equi-
librium concept for the case of non-differentiable global cost
functions and discontinuous LMPs which, as underlined in our
analysis, naturally arise from line congestion and maximum
generation capacity when the proposed linearized ACOPF is
considered. The left-hand side of (10) denotes the energy cost
variation ∆C j incurred by the single device j if it switches from
the candidate equilibrium solution u∗j to some other feasible
power profile u j ∈ U j. This cost variation is the difference
between the costs of increased power consumption at certain
time instants (priced at p¯∗) and the savings from reduced
power consumptions at other times (priced at
¯
p∗). At equi-
librium, as imposed in (10), the cost variations ∆C j associated
to a different strategy are always greater or equal than zero.
Note that, if the minimized generation cost ϕ(D) is a function
differentiable everywhere, the signals p¯∗ and
¯
p∗ are the same,
leading to the classical definition of Wardrop equilibrium. The
second part of the fixed point condition is given by (11), which
ensures that the overall power consumption of the devices
leads to same prices p¯∗ and
¯
p∗ considered in (10).
In order to derive an equilibrium condition that is equivalent
to the definition in (10), to be used in the subsequent analysis,
the following function is introduced:
γ(u, j, t¯,
¯
t) :=
(
¯
pµ j ,¯t
(D(u))− p¯µ j ,t¯(D(u))
)(
Pj−u j,t¯
)
u j,
¯
t .
(12)
The sign of γ indicates the possibility by the single load to
reduce its cost. If γ(u, j, t¯,
¯
t)> 0, the device j operating at bus
µ j, starting from a schedule u, can reduce its cost by swapping
power from time t =
¯
t to time t = t¯. In fact, considering the
non-negativity of the factors (Pj − u j,t¯) and u j,
¯
t in (12), the
condition γ(u, j, t¯,
¯
t)> 0 implies three distinct inequalities:
¯
pµ j ,¯t
(D(u))> p¯µ j ,t¯(D(u)) u j,t¯ < Pj u j,¯t
> 0.
The conditions above indicate, respectively, that:
• An advantageous price difference exists between
¯
t and t¯.
• The device j can consume more power at time t¯.
• The device j can consume less power at time
¯
t.
The last two points make the power swap between
¯
t and
¯
t
feasible, while the first one makes it cost-reducing for the
device j. It follows that an equilibrium is reached when γ is
always non positive and no device can perform a cost-reducing
power swap. This is formalized by the following result:
5Proposition 3: The scheduled power consumption u∗ ∈ U
corresponds to a variational Wardrop equilibrium, as presented
in Definition 2, if and only if:
γ(u∗, j, t¯,
¯
t)≤ 0 ∀ j ∈N , ∀(t¯,
¯
t) ∈A j×A j. (13)
Proof: See Appendix C
IV. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION OF FLEXIBLE DEMAND
This section proposes a distributed control strategy for
flexible demand coordination. This is initially characterized in
Section IV-A as a multi-valued mapping, theoretically demon-
strating with Lyapunov techniques and convexity arguments
its asymptotic convergence to a variational Wardrop equilib-
rium that is also socially optimal. An equivalent pseudo-code
algorithm representation is given in Section IV-B, whereas
Section IV-C discusses the implementation of the proposed
control strategy in practical contexts, envisioning a distributed
scheme where individual appliances iteratively update their
power scheduling, on the basis of broadcast price signals, in
order to reduce their energy cost.
A. Power update as evolution of dynamical system
The power scheduling update of the flexible appliances is
described by the following discrete-time dynamical system:
u(0) = u0 ∈U u(k+1) ∈ F(u(k)) (14)
where F :U 7→U is a multi-valued correspondence and u(k)
denotes the scheduled power consumption of the flexible loads
after k iterations of the proposed coordination strategy.
In order to characterize the multi-valued mapping F , the
following quantities are preliminarily introduced:
S j(u) := argmax
(t¯,
¯
t)∈A j×A j
γ(u, j, t¯,
¯
t) (15)
∆(u, j, t¯,
¯
t) := min
({
ε(D(u),µ j, t¯,¯
t),Pj−u j,t¯ ,u j,
¯
t
})
(16)
The set S j(u) associates to a device j ∈N the pairs of time
instants s j = (t¯ j,¯
t j) that maximize the function γ under the
current u and can therefore be considered for cost-reducing
power swaps. Considering the constraints in (6) and Definition
1 for ε , the function ∆ returns the maximum feasible power
swap that device j can perform between t¯ and
¯
t while
preserving their original price order.
The multi-value mapping Fj associated to the power
scheduling update of a single device j is now defined:
Fj(u) =
⋃
s j∈S j(u)
f (s j)(u) =
⋃
s j∈S j(u)
[
f
(s j)
1,1 (u), . . . , f
(s j)
N,T (u)
]
(17)
where the single component f
(s j)
i,t (u) of f
(s j)(u) in (17),
corresponding to the updated power consumption of device
i at time t, has the following expression when s j = (t¯,¯
t):
f
(s j)
i,t (u) = ui,t +∆(u, j, t¯,¯
t) ·1{ j}(i)
[
1{t¯}(t)−1{¯t}(t)
]
. (18)
When the mapping Fj(u) in (17) is applied, a single element
s j = (t¯ j,¯
t j) is selected within the set S j(u) and the device j
swaps power from time
¯
t j to t¯ j. The amount of swapped power
corresponds to ∆, defined in (16). The last two terms in its
minimum function ensure that the updated power scheduling
remains feasible, whereas the first term ε , defined in (5),
guarantees that the power swap is performed (i.e. ∆ > 0)
only if there is an advantageous price differential between
the time instants t¯ j and ¯
t j. All other devices i ∈ N \{ j}
maintain their previous power scheduling. The complete multi-
valued correspondence F in (14) can now be expressed as
the composition of N mappings Fj, iterated over the whole
population of flexible appliances N = {1, . . . ,N}:
F(u) := (FN ◦ · · · ◦F1)(u). (19)
The evolution of the power scheduling u(k) according to the
proposed update strategy can now be characterized as follows:
Definition 3: Given the dynamical system (14), with F
defined in (19), its solution set Ψ can be expressed as:
Ψ := {ψ : N→U : ψ(k+1) ∈ F(ψ(k)) ∀k ∈ N} . (20)
Some fundamental properties of the solution set Ψ are now
demonstrated, showing that the proposed power update strat-
egy (characterized by the mapping F) always converges to the
variational Wardrop equilibrium presented in Definition 2.
This is proved with Lyapunov arguments, selecting the
optimized generation costs ϕ(D) as the considered Lyapunov
function. Similarly to the Lyapunov stability theorem in the
discrete-time case, we aim to demonstrate that the function
ϕ(D) is always nonincreasing when evaluated over the state
trajectories (19) of system (14), as shown in Proposition 4.
This implies convergence to equilibrium – as demonstrated in
Theorem 1.
The first step in our analysis is the following result:
Proposition 4: For the optimized generation cost ϕ pre-
sented in (1), evaluated along any solution ψ ∈ Ψ, it holds:
ϕ(D(ψ(k+1)))≤ ϕ(D(ψ(k))) ∀k ∈ N (21a)
ψ(k+1) = ψ(k) ∀k : ϕ(D(ψ(k+1))) = ϕ(D(ψ(k)))
(21b)
lim
k→∞
ϕ(D(ψ(k))) = ϕ∞, ϕ∞ ∈ R+ (21c)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Proposition 4 shows that the proposed power update of the
flexible appliances, characterized by the multivalued mapping
F , has the fundamental property of reducing the total gen-
eration costs of the system at each iteration. As a result, the
minimized generation cost ϕ asymptotically converges to some
finite value ϕ∞. In addition, from (21b), the proposed strategy
updates the power scheduling of the appliances only if this
ensures a reduction of total costs. The main equilibrium and
optimality results can now be provided.
Theorem 1: Let Ω∗ denote the set of variational Wardrop
equilibria introduced in Definition 2. Indicating by |x|Γ the
distance between some element x ∈U and the set Γ⊆U , it
holds:
lim
k→∞
|ψ(k)|Ω∗ = 0 ∀ψ ∈Ψ. (22)
Proof: See Appendix E.
This result ensures that the proposed scheme asymptotically
converges to the set of variational Wardrop equilibria. In
6other words, when the final power scheduling is applied,
each device has no unilateral interest in modifying its power
consumption in order to reduce its energy cost. This property
holds for any grid topology, any penetration level of flexible
demand and all parameters of the price-responsive appliances.
Global optimality of the Wardrop equilibrium can also be
demonstrated, under some mild assumptions:
Theorem 2: If the optimized generation cost is differentiable
at the Wardrop equilibrium u∗ ∈Ω∗, i.e. D=D(u∗) /∈D in (3),
the following optimality property is verified:
ϕ (D(u∗))≤ ϕ (D(u)) ∀u ∈U . (23)
Proof: See Appendix F.
The theorem shows that any Wardrop equilibrium u∗ is also
socially optimal if the function ϕ(D) is differentiable at D =
D(u∗). In these cases, there exists no feasible power scheduling
u∈U whose associated generation cost ϕ(D(u)) is lower than
ϕ(D(u∗)) obtained at equilibrium.
B. Pseudo-Code and Flowchart Representation
Algorithm 1 Iterative scheme - Flex. demand coordination
1) Initialization phase. Starting values for power schedul-
ing of the appliances and flag variables are set:
u(0) = u0 ∈U k = 0 conv = 0
2) Power scheduling update. The scheduled power profiles
of the individual appliances are iteratively updated:
WHILE (conv = 0)
a) conv = 1
b) k = k+1.
c) u(k) = u(k−1).
d) FOR j = 1 : 1 : N
i) FIND (t¯∗,
¯
t∗) such that:
(t¯∗,
¯
t∗) ∈ argmax
(t¯,
¯
t)∈A j×A j
γ(u(k), j, t¯,
¯
t)
ii) IF γ(u(k), j, t¯∗,
¯
t∗)> 0
conv = 0 δ = ∆(u(k), j, t¯∗,
¯
t∗)
u j,t¯∗(k) = u j,t¯∗(k)+δ u j,
¯
t∗(k) = u j,
¯
t∗(k)−δ .
END FOR
END WHILE
3) Final results. The Wardrop equilibrium solution is equal
to the power scheduling at the last iteration:
u∗ = u(k).
The power scheduling update described by (19) and (17) can
be performed through Algorithm 1, graphically summarized
by the flowchart in Fig. 1. The Initialization phase of
the algorithm sets the power scheduling u(0) of the whole
population to some initial value u0. In the Power scheduling
update phase, each full execution of the FOR cycle in step
2.b) corresponds to the application of the mapping F in (19).
In particular, each single iteration with index j is equivalent to
the application of Fj in (17). First, the time instants t¯∗,¯
t∗ ∈A j
Start
Find
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
End
Fig. 1. Flowchart of Algorithm 1.
which maximize γ are selected. Then, if the maximized γ is
positive, the device j can reduce its energy cost by shifting the
amount of power δ from
¯
t∗ to t¯∗. As established in Theorem
1, the algorithm converges to a Wardrop equilibrium. When
γ(u(k), j, t¯ j,¯
t j) ≤ 0 for all j ∈N and (t¯ j,¯t j) ∈ A j×A j, thelogical variable conv remains equal to 1 throughout the FOR
cycle and the final scheduling u∗ = u(k), returned in the Final
results phase, fulfills (13) in Proposition 3.
C. Implementation Scheme
Algorithm 1 constitutes a pseudo-code representation of the
iterated application of the multi-valued mapping F in (19).
It details the steps required to calculate the modified power
schedule by each individual load and specifies the stopping
criterion for the iterative updates. In the rest of this section,
we present an implementation scheme for the application
of this algorithm in a distributed way, considering iterated
broadcast of prices and individual devices that autonomously
modify their power schedule to reduce their costs. Relying on
a bi-directional communication scheme between the system
operator and the flexible loads, the operations associated to
each step of the algorithm can be performed as follows:
1) Initialization phase: Each device j determines an initial
feasible power consumption profile u j(0) = u0j ∈ U j. This
can be obtained by broadcasting a certain price signal p
to all the appliances and letting each device j schedule its
power consumption u j(0) = u0j in order to minimize (9). The
scheduled power profiles u(0) are communicated to the central
entity, which determines the resulting aggregate power demand
D(u(0)) through (8).
72) Power scheduling update: Implementation of the WHILE
cycle in step 2 can be performed as follows:
• The price signals p¯µ j(D(u(k))) and
¯
pµ j(D(u(k))), i.e. the
locational marginal prices at bus m = µ j associated to the
current demand profile D are calculated according to (4) and
broadcast to device j. This device can then independently
determine the time instants t¯∗,
¯
t∗ ∈ A j of an advantageous
power swap reducing its energy cost (as in step 2.b.iii of
Algorithm 1).
• The device j applies (16) and independently calculates δ
in step 2.b.iv of Algorithm 1, i.e. the maximum amount
of power consumption that can be swapped in its power
schedule from time
¯
t∗ to t¯∗.
• The device j communicates t¯∗,
¯
t∗ and δ to the central entity
which in turn calculates the new demand profile D(u(k+1))
and the convergence flag conv.
3) Final results: When Algorithm 1 converges to a Wardrop
equilibrium, as proven in Theorem 1, the WHILE cycle
described above is concluded and the devices cannot further
reduce their energy costs. Their final power profiles u∗j will be
equal to u j(k) at the last iteration k.
D. Methods for faster algorithm convergence
The coordination scheme in Algorithm 1 has been chosen
for its simplicity and because it directly maps the multi-valued
function F , introduced in (19) to analytically describe the
scheduling update of the loads. Some alternative approaches
that can ensure faster convergence are discussed below:
1) Multiple power swaps: Each load performs multiple
simultaneous power swaps between distinct pairs of time
instants that are characterized by advantageous price differen-
tials. Within this framework, the convergence and optimality
properties presented in Theorem 1 and 2 are preserved.
2) Best response strategy: Each load directly applies its
cost-minimizing schedule in response to a price broadcast,
with no impact of its previous power scheduling. This ap-
proach has exhibited fast convergence to equilibrium in sim-
ulation, but such result has not been formally proved.
3) One-shot strategy: With this method, discussed in detail
in [15] for a simplified pricing structure, the flexible loads
are coordinated through the broadcast of a single price signal
(different in general for each load). These prices are calculated
by the central coordinator, which receives the characteristics
and task parameters of all the devices and internally emulates
Algorithm 1 to calculate the final equilibrium solution. It
should be mentioned that, in this case, one-shot convergence
is obtained at the expenses of the loads’ privacy.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The performance of the proposed control scheme is assessed
in simulation on the IEEE 24-bus system [31]. The generation
cost fm(g) at each bus m is assumed to be a quadratic function
of the power generation g, i.e. fm(g) = amg2+bmg. A diagram
with relevant quantities of the considered system is shown
in Fig. 2 and all other parameters can be found in [31].
The inflexible active demand profiles dm,t are derived from
historical data and are in general different for each bus. Their
Fig. 2. Diagram of the IEEE 24-bus system.
values are shown in Fig. 3 (left - black dashed lines). It is
assumed that all the inflexible loads operate at 0.95 lagging
power factor and that, at each bus, the feasible range of voltage
magnitudes is between 0.9 and 1.1 p.u.. Additionally, power
losses are neglected. A future scenario with high penetration
of electric vehicles is considered and Nm ⊆N represents the
subset of Nm devices operating at bus m (chosen values of Nm
are shown in Fig. 2). Each vehicle j is modelled as a load with
unity power factor [32]. The required energy E j of all devices
j ∈Nm is chosen according to a Gaussian distribution with
mean xEm and standard deviation δEm . In addition, it is assumed
that all the vehicles at bus m have the same rated power Pm.
For instance, the energy and power parameters for the EVs at
bus 1 are selected as follows:
xE1 = 30 kWh δ
E
1 = 1kWh P1 = 10kW.
The final time T = 24h and time discretization step ∆t =
0.25h are chosen for the considered time horizon. It is assumed
that each vehicle j can operate in a continuous time interval
[t j, t j+d j]. The equivalent availability window A j of the single
device j can be expressed in discrete time as:
A j =
{
t ∈T : t j ≤ t ·∆t ≤ t j +d j
}
. (24)
The values of t j and d j for all devices j ∈Nm operating at
bus m are also determined according to Gaussian distributions
with mean values xtm and x
d
m and standard deviations δ tm and
δ dm, respectively. For example, the availability parameters for
the EVs at bus 1 are:
xt1 = 21 : 30 h δ
t
1 = 1.5 h x
d
1 = 10 h δ
d
1 = 1.5 h.
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Fig. 3. Demand profiles (left) and electricity prices (right): no flexible demand
(black dashed trace), with proposed scheduling (red trace) and PG scenario
(blue dashed trace).
It should be noted that the normal distributions used to gen-
erate the EVs parameters E j, t j and d j are properly truncated
and rescaled in order to ensure feasibility and well-posedness
of the considered scheduling problem.
A. Algorithm Implementation
The coordination of the flexible devices has been performed
with Algorithm 1. The initial condition u(0) = u0 in Step
1) envisages constant power profiles for all loads. In the
power update of Step 2), single devices have been sequentially
selected at each iteration. A single power swap is performed
as detailed in step 2.d) before moving on to the next device.
The final results of the proposed coordination scheme,
denoted by the star superscript, have been compared with the
scenario PG (price-greedy). In this latter case, a more naive
approach is applied and each appliance j ∈Nm determines its
power consumption profile according to the price p¯m(d), i.e.
the electricity price when only inflexible demand d is consid-
ered. The total power consumption of the flexible appliances
in this scenario is denoted as uPG.
The demand and price profiles obtained with the two
policies mentioned above are compared in Fig. 3. For length
reasons, a limited number of relevant buses is considered. In
the present case study, the two price signals p¯ and
¯
p introduced
in (4) coincide in all cases and therefore only the signal p¯ is
shown. The most relevant trend that we wish to emphasize is
that the electricity price p¯m(D(u∗)) obtained with the proposed
control strategy is consistently flatter than p¯m(D(uPG)). All
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Fig. 4. Generation profiles: no flexible demand (black dashed trace), with
proposed scheduling (red trace) and PG scenario (blue dashed trace).
the electric vehicles schedule their charge between 22:00h
and 7:00h, when the electricity price at their bus is constant
and minimum. As expected, at equilibrium no device can
exploit any price differential to reduce its energy cost and
therefore has no unilateral interest in changing its final power
consumption profile. Note that the same flattening trend, albeit
on a lesser scale, appears in the demand profiles Dm(u∗), which
do not exhibit the significant rebound peaks of Dm(uPG). The
flattening of the demand profiles Dm(u∗) in Fig. 3 is only
partial since the iterative power update of the devices is based
on differences in LMPs which, in general, do not exclusively
depend on local demand but are also affected in non-trivial
ways by the demand values at other buses.
The generation profiles obtained with the proposed control
scheme and under the PG scenario are compared in Fig. 4. It
can be seen that, differently from the significant variation ex-
perienced in the PG case, the presented coordination algorithm
completely flattens generation at each bus during night-time.
Some relevant examples of apparent power flows (obtained
with the proposed algorithm and in the PG case) are rep-
resented in Fig. 5. It can be seen that, in general, there
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Fig. 5. Power flows: no flexible demand (black dashed trace), application of
proposed scheduling (red trace) and PG scenario (blue dashed trace).
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Fig. 6. The comparison of price profiles at buses 7 and 8 for D = D(u∗).
are reduced variations over time when the final configuration
with D = D(u∗) is considered. Note also that line 27 always
operates at its maximum capacity.
To assess the impact of generation capacity limits and
lines congestion on the locational marginal prices, LMPs at
buses 7 and 8 for D = D(u∗) are plotted in Fig. 6. A few
interesting trends can be underlined. As expected, the two
prices p¯7,t(D(u∗)) and p¯8,t(D(u∗)) will be the same when
there is no congestion on the line 11 connecting them (see
top-left plot of Fig. 5). As soon as congestion appears on line
11, the prices become different: the LMP at bus 8 will vary
continuously and its variations will be linked with the ones
of other buses (i.e. buses 9 and 10), which are connected to
bus 8 by lines 12 and 13 (not congested). Conversely, in this
situation any additional unit of power at bus 7 can only be
provided by generator 7 at its marginal generation cost, which
leads to the negative price jump of p¯7,t(D(u∗) (black trace).
B. Robustness with respect to uncertainties
The proposed control strategy operates under the assump-
tion that the inflexible demand d is known without uncer-
tainties and it does not explicitly account in its formulation
for forecast errors on demand and generation. In order to
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Fig. 7. Average energy cost Cav (left) and average generation costs ϕav (right)
as functions of the parameter σ .
quantify the performance degradation when these elements are
included in the case study, it is assumed that the coordination
of the price-responsive loads is performed with an estimate
d˜ of inflexible demand, which in general is different from
the actual demand profile d. Denoting by d˜m,t the estimated
inflexible demand at bus m and time t, we have:
d˜m,t = dm,t +ηm,t (25)
where ηm,t represents the forecast error on inflexible demand at
bus m at time t. Assuming that renewable generation has zero
marginal cost and it is always dispatched first, the quantity
ηm,t can equivalently represent a negative error forecast in
renewable generation. The error forecast ηm is characterized
as a random walk ηm,t+1 = ηm,t +σmet , where et represents
uncorrelated white noise with zero mean and unitary variance.
With this formulation, consistently with basic models for wind
error forecast, ηm,t is a random variable with zero mean
and standard deviation equal to σm ·
√
t. To account for error
forecast correlation at the different buses due to geographical
proximity, two independent noise signals et are considered for
the South buses (e.g. buses 1-12) and for the North ones (buses
13-24). The value of σm at each node m is obtained as the
rescaling of a unique parameter σ by the fraction of total
demand at that node.
The coordination algorithm has been applied by considering
the inflexible demand estimate d˜ rather than the actual profile
d, denoting by u˜∗ the power scheduling of the appliances at
the final equilibrium solution. In this case of imperfect infor-
mation, the total generation costs will be equal to ϕ(D(u˜∗))
and the energy cost C˜ j sustained by the single device j will
correspond to:
C˜ j =
T
∑
t=1
pµ j ,t(D(u˜
∗)) · u˜∗j,t ·∆t
The optimal scheduling u˜∗ has been calculated over L = 50
realizations of the estimated inflexible demand profile d˜. The
resulting cost Cav (average of C˜ j over all devices and demand
realizations) and the total generation costs ϕav (average of
ϕ(D(u˜∗)) over all demand realizations) are plotted in Fig. 8
as a function of the standard deviation parameter σ .
As expected, for increasing values of σ (corresponding
to higher forecast errors) the average energy cost Cav for
the individual load and the average total generation costs
ϕav increase. However, it can be seen that the performance
degradation remains relatively small, even when large values
of the standard deviation parameter σ are considered.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a novel distributed scheme for the
coordination of large populations of flexible electric loads. A
comprehensive modelling framework is proposed for demand
response operating in multi-bus power systems, explicitly
accounting for the congestion of transmission lines and the
impact of flexible demand on the locational marginal prices
at each bus. The main original contribution is a theoretical
analysis that provides guarantees of convergence to a stable
market outcome and global optimality, for any grid topology
and penetration level of flexible demand. In addition, a double
pricing structure and a novel concept of variational Wardrop
equilibrium are proposed to characterize stable market config-
urations in the case of discontinuous price functions. Practical
implementation of the presented control scheme is discussed
and its performance is evaluated in simulation on the IEEE
24-bus system with high penetration of electric vehicles.
The analysis in this paper only considers the impact of price-
responsive loads on the transmission infrastructure. Future
work will expand the existing modelling framework to account
for the effect of flexible demand on the distribution network.
The approach proposed by [23] will initially be investigated,
adding the contribution of flexible demand to the base load and
adopting proper simulation tools to quantify the resulting load
flows. A theoretical study will also be conducted, evaluating
whether the presented results of convergence and optimality
can be extended to a double-level network topology which
accounts for transmission and distribution at the same time.
Finally, the possibility of conducting a stochastic optimization
which explicitly models and accounts for uncertainties on
demand and generation will be explored.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Two key points are preliminarily shown. Firstly, the objec-
tive function in the right-hand side of (1) is strictly convex
given the strict convexity of each fm. Secondly, let G (D)
denote the set of feasible solution vectors – including active
and reactive power generation (G,GQ), voltage angle and
squared magnitude (θ ,v2) – that fulfill (2) for a certain
D ∈ RMT . The graph of G is convex. This property follows
from the linearity and convexity of the constraints in (2). As a
result, the strict convexity of ϕ(D) with respect to D follows
from the maximum theorem under convexity [33].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For simplicity, we consider the simplified case in which the
minimized generation cost ϕ(D) in (1) is always differentiable.
As a result, prices at bus m at time t are unique and equal to:
p¯m,t(D) =
¯
pm,t(D) = pm,t(D) =
∂ϕ(D)
∂Dm,t
. (26)
From Proposition 1, we have that ϕ(D) is a strictly convex
function and therefore its Hessian matrix H is positive definite,
with H  0. From basic properties of positive definite matrices,
the following holds for each diagonal element of H:
∂ 2ϕ(D)
∂D2m,t
> 0 ∀t,m. (27)
To verify the proposition statement, it is sufficient to check
the positivity of the following partial derivative:
∂ pm,t(D)
∂Dm,t
=
∂
∂Dm,t
(
∂ϕ(D)
∂Dm,t
)
=
∂ 2ϕ(D)
∂D2m,t
> 0 ∀t,m. (28)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Each feasible power schedule u j for agent j can be ex-
pressed as the sum of the strategy u∗j at the candidate equilib-
rium solution plus a finite number Q of elementary variations:
u j = u∗j +
Q
∑
q=1
δq (29)
where each term δq : T → R, for some ∆q > 0 and (t¯q,¯tq) ∈A j×A j has the following expression:
δq,t = ∆q ·1{t¯q}(t)−∆q ·1{¯tq}(t). (30)
The above expressions can represent all the elements u j ∈
U j, since these are characterized by the same fixed sum. In
addition, one can assume without loss of generality that each
δq corresponds to a feasible power swap of ∆q between the
time instants t¯q and ¯
tq. As a result, it must hold:
0 < ∆q ≤min
({
Pj−u∗j,t¯q ,u∗j,¯tq
})
(31)
If one substitutes (29) in (10), the cost variation ∆C j can be
written as:
∆C j =∑
q
[
p¯∗µ j ,t¯q(D(u
∗))−
¯
p∗µ j ,¯tq
(D(u∗))
]
∆q∆t (32)
Suppose that ∆C j < 0 for some u j ∈U j. From (31) and (32)
there should exist qˆ≤ Q such that the following holds:
p¯∗µ j ,t¯qˆ(D(u
∗))≤
¯
p∗µ j ,¯tqˆ
(D(u∗)) u∗j,t¯qˆ < Pj u
∗
j,
¯
tqˆ > 0. (33)
This would imply γ(u∗, j, t¯qˆ,¯
tqˆ)> 0, thus proving the proposi-
tion statement by contradiction.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof of (21a): An equivalent condition is verified:
ϕ(D(u+))≤ ϕ(D(u)) ∀u+ ∈ F(u), ∀u ∈U . (34)
From (19), F is the composition of N elementary mappings
Fj, defined in (17). Therefore, a slightly stronger condition can
be proven by means of inequalities on each Fj:
ϕ(D(y))≤ ϕ(D(u)) ∀y ∈ Fj(u),∀ j ∈N , ∀u ∈U . (35)
Note that (35) holds if, for all s j(u) = (t¯ j,¯
t j)∈ S j(u), we have:
ϕ
(
D
(
f (s j(u))
))
< ϕ (D(u)) if γ(u, j, t¯ j,¯
t j)> 0 (36a)
ϕ
(
D
(
f (s j(u))
))
= ϕ (D(u)) if γ(u, j, t¯ j,¯
t j)≤ 0 (36b)
For the case of (36a) with γ(u, j, t¯ j,¯
t j)> 0, since by definition
u j,t¯ j ≤ Pj and u j,¯t j ≥ 0, as a result of (12) it holds:(
¯
pµ j ,¯t
(D(u))− p¯µ j ,t¯(D(u))
)
> 0 u j,t¯ j < Pj u j,¯t j
> 0. (37)
For the function ε in (5), given the monotonicity of p¯ and
¯
p
established in Proposition 2, we have:
ε (D(u),µ j, t¯ j,¯
t j)> 0 (38)
which implies positivity of ∆ in (16), as a result of (37):
∆(u,µ j, t¯ j,¯
t j) = ∆¯> 0. (39)
Recalling expressions (8) and (18), and applying the mean
value theorem for non-smooth functions [34], the left-hand
side in (36a) can be rewritten as follows:
ϕ
(
D
(
f (s j(u))
))
= ϕ
(
D
(
u+ ∆¯
(
eˆ j,t¯ j − eˆ j,¯t j
)))
= ϕ
(
D(u)+ ∆¯
(
eˆµ j ,t¯ j − eˆµ j ,¯t j
))
= ϕ(D(u))+
〈
∂ϕ(D˜), ∆¯
(
eˆµ j ,t¯ j − eˆµ j ,¯t j
)〉 (40)
where D˜ is some convex combination of D(u) and D
(
f (s j(u))
)
and ∂ϕ denotes the generalized gradient of ϕ . From Proposi-
tion 1, this corresponds to the subdifferential of ϕ . The above
equation can now be rewritten as:
ϕ
(
D
(
f (s j(u))
))
= ϕ (D(u))+ ∆¯
(
p¯∗−
¯
p∗
)
(41)
with p¯∗ ∈ ∂ϕ(D˜)∂Dµ j ,t¯ j and ¯
p∗ ∈ ∂ϕ(D˜)∂Dµ j ,¯t j
. Condition (36a) is therefore
verified by the positivity of ∆¯ in (39) and the following:
p¯∗
(a)
≤ ϕ¯ ′µ j ,t¯ j(D˜)
(b)
< p¯µ j ,t¯ j
(
D
(
f (s j(u))
))
(c)
≤
¯
pµ j ,¯t j
(
D
(
f (s j(u))
)) (d)
<
¯
ϕ ′µ j ,¯t j
(D˜)
(e)
≤
¯
p∗.
(42)
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The inequalities (a) and (e) follow from (3) and (4), (b) and
(d) are a result of Proposition 2 and (c) holds by construction
of ε(D(u),µ j, t¯ j,¯
t j) as expressed in (5) in Definition 1. We can
conclude that (36a) holds as a result of (41) and (42). Similar
arguments can be used to also verify (36b), thus proving (21a).
Proof of (21b): Since ϕ is nonincreasing when any Fj is
applied, (36b) must hold for all j ∈N when u = ψ(k) and
ϕ(ψ(k+ 1)) = ϕ(ψ(k)). As previously proved, this implies
∆(u,µ j, t¯ j,¯
t j) = 0 for all j and therefore ψ(k+1) = ψ(k).
Proof of (21c): This property straightly follows from (21a)
and the boundedness of ϕ .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider the omega-limit set Ω(ψ) associated to the solu-
tion ψ ∈Ψ and defined as follows:
Ω(ψ) :=
{
u∞ : ∃{kn}n∈N , limn→∞kn = ∞, limn→∞ψ(kn) = u∞
}
.
(43)
The theorem is verified if the following holds for all ψ ∈Ψ:
lim
k→∞
|ψ(k)|Ω(ψ) = 0 (44a)
Ω(ψ)⊆Ω∗. (44b)
Condition (44a): this result holds if the mapping F is upper-
semicontinuous [35, Chapter 6.3.3]. Since F takes non-empty
compact values, the upper-semicontinuity of the mapping is
guaranteed by F having a closed graph G [36, Chapter 3B].
Accounting for the compactness of U , it is sufficient to show
that the graph G j of the individual mappings Fj in (19) is
closed [37]. The graph G j can be expressed as:
G j =
{
(u, f (s j)(u)) : u ∈U , f (s j)(u) ∈ Fj(u)
}
=
⋃
s j∈A j×A j
G (s j) =
⋃
s j∈A j×A j
{
(u, f (s j)(u)) : u ∈U (s j)
}
.
(45)
where U (s j) ⊆U has the following expression:
U (s j) = { u ∈U : s j = (t¯ j,¯t j) ∈ S j(u) }= { u ∈U : s j = (t¯ j,¯t j),γ(u, j, t¯ j,¯t j)≥ γ(u, j, t¯,¯t) ∀(t¯,¯t) ∈A j×A j
}
.
(46)
One can verify that G (s j) is closed since the state-space subset
U (s j) is closed (defined by a set of non-strict inequalities) and
each component f
(s j)
i,t (u) of f
(s j)(u) in (17) is continuous with
respect to u. This means that also G j is closed (union of a
finite number of closed sets), thus proving the closedness of
G , the upper semi-continuity of F and condition (44a).
Condition (44b): To verify that each point in Ω(ψ) also
belongs to the set of variational Wardrop equilibria Ω∗, it is
preliminarily shown that, as a result of (21c) and continuity
of ϕ and D, the following holds for all u∞ ∈Ω(ψ):
ϕ(D(u∞))=ϕ
(
D
(
lim
n→∞ψ(kn)
))
= lim
n→∞ϕ(D(ψ(kn)))
= lim
k→∞
ϕ(D(ψ(k))) = ϕ∞.
(47)
Moreover, as a result of the outer-semicontinuity of the map-
ping F , weak-forward invariance of Ω(ψ) is also guaranteed
[35, Chapter 6.3.3]:
F(u∞)∩Ω(ψ) 6=∅ ∀u∞ ∈Ω(ψ). (48)
As (47) establishes that all points u∞ ∈Ω(ψ) have equal gen-
eration costs ϕ∞ and ϕ is non decreasing along all trajectories
ψ , there must exist s1 = (t¯1,¯
t1) ∈ S1(u∞) such that:
ϕ
(
D
(
f (s1)(u∞)
))
= ϕ(D(u∞)) γ(u∞,1, t¯1,¯
t1)≤ 0. (49)
If this were not the case, from (19) and (21a), we would have:
ϕ(D(u+))< ϕ(D(u∞)) ∀u+ ∈ F(u∞)
which contradicts (48) if one considers (47). As γ is maxi-
mized by all s ∈ S1(u∞) from (15), we have:
γ(u∞,1, t¯,¯
t)≤ 0 ∀s = (t¯,
¯
t) ∈ S1(u∞). (50a)
∆(u∞,1, t¯,¯
t) = 0 ∀s = (t¯,
¯
t) ∈ S1(u∞) (50b)
where (50b) also implies F1(u∞)= {u∞}. Recursive application
of the same arguments for j = 2, . . . ,N yields:
γ(u∞, j, t¯,¯
t)≤ 0 ∀s j = (t¯,¯t) ∈ S j(u∞),∀ j ∈N . (51)
The proof of (44b) is concluded by noting that, from (15),
conditions (51) and (13) in Proposition 3 when u∗ = u∞.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Given the differentiability of ϕ(D(u∗)), the following gra-
dient vector can be derived from (3):
∇mϕ(D) =
[
∂ϕ(D)
∂Dm,1
, . . . ,
∂ϕ(D)
∂Dm,T
]
=
[
ϕ ′m,1(D), . . . ,ϕ
′
m,T (D)
]
.
(52)
From the strict convexity of ϕ(D) in Proposition 1, it is
sufficient to prove the following local condition for any u∈U :
〈∇mϕ(D(u∗)),Dm(u)−Dm(u∗)〉
=
T
∑
t=1
ϕ ′m,t(D(u
∗)) · [Dm,t(u)−Dm,t(u∗)]
=
T
∑
t=1
ϕ ′m,t(D(u
∗))
[
∑
j:µ j=m
u j,t −u∗j,t
]
≥ 0
∀m ∈M .
(53)
We recall that any u ∈U can be characterized as the sum of
u∗ and a finite number Q of power swaps δq, as presented in
equations (29)-(30) in the proof of Proposition 3. Therefore,
condition (53) holds if the following is verified for all j ∈N :
T
∑
t=1
ϕ ′µ j ,t(D(u
∗))
[
u j,t −u∗j,t
]
=
T
∑
t=1
ϕ ′µ j ,t(D(u
∗))
[
Q
∑
q=1
δq,t
]
=
Q
∑
q=1
∆q
[
ϕ ′µ j ,t¯q(D(u
∗))−ϕ ′µ j ,¯tq(D(u
∗))
]
=
Q
∑
q=1
∆q
[
p¯µ j ,t¯q(D(u
∗))−
¯
pµ j ,¯tq
(D(u∗))
]
≥ 0.
(54)
Consider now the equilibrium condition (13) in Proposition 3.
From expression (12) of γ and recalling (31) from the feasibi-
lity of δq, one can conclude that
¯
pµ j ,¯tq
(D(u∗))≤ p¯µ j ,t¯q(D(u∗))
at the equilibrium u∗ ∈Ω∗, thus proving (54) and the theorem.
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